

Message Text

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SUBJ: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-PLENARY DISCUSSIONS, APRIL 7, 1976
(SALT TWO - 968)

1. (ROWNY/TRUSOV-BELETISKY, A-1215)

ICBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION

IN RESPONSE TO ROWNY'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION (OF A POINT FROM SEMEMOV'S STATEMENT) AS TO WHAT CRITERIA THE SOVIETS WOULD USE IN DETERMINING THAT A PARTICULAR TYPE OF LAUNCHER HAD BEEN "SPECIALLY DEVELOPED, TESTED, AND DEPLOYED". TRUSOV EMPHASIZED THAT SEMENOV'S STATEMENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT UNDER THEIR FORMULATION NO ICBM LAUNCHER COULD EXIST OTHER THAN LAUNCHERS SPECIALLY DEVELOPED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS. HE SAID THAT THEIR FORMULATION, TOGETHER WITH THE PROHIBITION OF CONVERSION OF NON-ICBM LAUNCHERS TO ICBM LAUNCHERS, MAKES THEIR DEFINITION CLEAR AND CONCISE. HE ADDED THAT THEIR ADDITION OF THE WORD "TESTING" WAS OF IMPORTANT SIGNIFICANCE.

WHEN DISCUSSING HOW THE SOVIET FORMULATION WOULD TAKE INTO
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ACCOUNT DUAL CAPABLE LAUNCHERS, TRUSOV REPEATED THAT IT WAS THE

SOVIET'S POSITION THAT A LAUNCHER WHICH WAS DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN ICBM LAUNCHER. WHEN ROWNY PRESSED THE QUESTION OF DUAL CAPABILITY, BELETSKY SAID THAT IF A LAUNCHER HAD CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM, THAT LAUNCHER WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN ICBM LAUNCHER REGARDLESS OF ITS ASSOCIATION WITH ANY OTHER MISSILE.

2. (EARLE-SCHNEITER/SHCHUKIN, A-1259)

A. ICBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION

EARLE INITIATED A DISCUSSION ON THE ICBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION, INCLUDING THE US RATIONALE FOR BASING THIS DEFINITION ON LAUNCHER "TYPE". SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS VERY CAREFUL WITH THE WORDS IT USED IN THIS REGARD. THE U.S. USES THE WORD "TYPE" IN ITS DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS, AND THIS GIVES THE SOVIETS PROBLEMS BECAUSE IN THIS MANNER THE US ATTEMPTING TO COUNT TANKERS AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, HE AGREED THAT SOMETHING MORE IS REQUIRED THAN A DETERMINATION FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL LAUNCHER.

B. MIRV VERIFICATION

SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IN THE EXTREME HE COULD SAY THAT MINUTEMAN II LAUNCHERS WERE OF THE SAME TYPE AS MINUTEMAN III LAUNCHERS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS KNEW THAT THE LAUNCHERS FOR MINUTEMAN III'S CONTAINED MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, WHEREAS THE LAUNCHERS FOR MINUTEMAN II'S DID NOT. EARLE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SHCHUKIN TO BE SAYING THAT A SIDE WOULD NOT COUNT LAUNCHERS EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR BY TYPE. HE ASKED HOW THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD MAKE THE BRIDGE FROM INDIVIDUAL LAUNCHERS TO SOME NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS. SHCHUKIN ANSWERED THAT BY "SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATIONS" BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER A LAUNCHER FIELD OR LAUNCHER AREA CONTAINED MINUTEMAN II'S OR MINUTEMAN III'S.

EARLE SAID THAT HE HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE LOGIC OF THE SOVIET POSITION. WITH RESPECT TO ICBM LAUNCHERS, THEY APPEARED TO HAVE, AT LEAST IMPLICITLY, ADOPTED A "TYPE" RULE, WHEREAS THEY REFUSE TO ACCEPT SUCH A RULE WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO BE EQUALLY

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APPLICABLE TO MIRV LAUNCHERS. HE ASKED WHY THE SOVIET SIDE RESISTED THIS APPROACH FOR MIRV VERIFICATION. SHCHUKIN SAID

THAT THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A LAUNCHER IS A LAUNCHER OF A MISSILE OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE WAS BASED NOT ONLY ON THE OUTWARD APPEARANCE OF THE LAUNCHER, BUT ALSO WHAT THE LAUNCHER WAS ARMED WITH. THIS COULD BE DETERMINED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HE REALIZED THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS COULD NOT

DISTINGUISH WHICH MISSILE WAS IN EVERY LAUNCHER BECAUSE CONDITIONS MIGHT BE UNFAVORABLE FOR THAT. HOWEVER, THE EMPLACEMENT OF A MISSILE IN A LAUNCHER CAN BE DETERMINED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THEREFORE, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, A SIDE CAN TELL WHICH LAUNCHERS CONTAIN WHICH MISSILES. SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT IN THIS CONNECTION AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SPOKEN OF EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH ICBMS AND ICBM LAUNCHERS.

WHILE DISCUSSING PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MIRV VERIFICATION, EARLE MADE THE CASE IN WHICH A SIDE HAD TESTED A MISSILE BOTH WITH AND WITHOUT MIRVS, SUCH AS THE SOVIET SIDE HAD DONE; IT WAS THE US POSITION THAT ALL MISSILES OF THAT TYPE MUST BE CONSIDERED AS MIRVED. SHCHUKIN DID NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH THIS POINT.

IN CLOSING, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE QUESTION OF MIRV VERIFICATION WOULD BE DECIDED AT A HIGHER LEVEL. JOHNSON

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